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There is a new political and economic policy lurking at the
periphery of European politics, a policy that is not invited 
to the main table with party political manifestoes but lurks
in the shadows like a feared but known ghost. Whilst 
the concept of pricing roads in the form of tolls is not new,
a convergence of mature technology, transport growth
surpassing the ability to build infrastructure and the
European Single Market have raised the prospect of a new
comprehensive and somewhat Orwellian version of paying
for something we regarded as free.
The perception of road pricing as political suicide may kill
the emergent policy tool. It has been declared as
'completely at odds with the Spanish mentality' (Montero
2001), but in certain key countries it is moving forward to
trial and implementation.
How will road freight be affected by road pricing? Will it
move faster, with higher utilisation, making more drops with
fewer vehicles? Will freight deliveries move to avoid peak
times? Will funds from pricing finance new freight roads 
or loading bays? Can road pricing be accepted by the freight
operators? Will they absorb or pass on the cost, and will it
lead to a consolidation of the market to fewer players? 
This paper aims to make an overview of the initiatives and
research ongoing, and the political and legal framework in
which this activity is ongoing.
The problem, perceived or otherwise
Traffic in Europe is growing at a rate that most political
observers regard as untenable. From 1990 to 2010, goods
transport is estimated to grow in billion-tonne-km by 38%,
passenger transport by 24% and heavy goods traffic on
roads by 50%.
In the UK it is clear that light goods vehicles (LGV) are
growing both absolutely and as a proportion of the freight
fleet, growing 13% from 1992 to 2000, compared to HGV
growth of 2.4% over the same timeframe.
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Road pricing and freight
Road pricing excites a variety of reactions from freight operators. It is not only in the UK that the
projected toll roads have caused a furore, but it is also the case in several other European countries.
Are toll roads the fairest way to charge for the true cost of road freight transportation?
In Switzerland, toll roads
are expected to earn
around €5 million a year
from 2005
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Congestion is growing across Europe, especially in urban
areas. Whilst traffic jams are infuriating, they are also
expensive in direct economic cost. Currently 10% of the
road network suffers congestion daily, with city roads being
the worst affected. Idling in a queue costs fuel, roughly 6%
of annual EU consumption according to the Commission,
and the associated external costs amount to 0.5% of
Community GDP, forecast to rise to 1% by 2010.
The focus of the EU on sustainable development, on
reducing greenhouse gas emission and reducing pollution
means that the growth of road transport and urban
transport in particular is a key area of interest for the
Commission. Emissions from transport are a significant part
of all emissions, NOVEM identified 47% of all energy use in
a typical household as being transport related. 84% of CO2
emissions from all transport are attributable to road traffic,
and urban transport accounts for 40% of CO2 emissions.
Lorries are just 2% of all road vehicles; they cause 24% 
of carbon dioxide emissions generated by road traffic. CO2
emissions are forecast to grow by 50% between 1990 and
2010. Measures to reduce transport growth have to be 
a priority for the EU and member states.
One solution to excess demand is for supply to be
increased. In the area of roads – and all other modes – this
is not being done. Irrespective of the fiscal basis for
infrastructure projects, only 25% of the road network
identified in 1996 as crucial to meeting increased demand
has actually been built. European governments are falling
behind in meeting the needs for future infrastructure,
and exacerbating an existing problem. At a recent 
conference, the difficulty of funding future transport
networks led inexorably to the concept of charging for
infrastructure to generate revenue to invest in 
capital projects.
A more parochial problem has also been seen by many
as being solved by road pricing. Truckers in the UK,
Germany and the Netherlands all see foreign competition
as essentially unfair in that the lorries and drivers operate 
from home nations where fuel, excise duties, vehicle and
road tax are different. The hauliers concerned always
perceive the difference as being to their disadvantage, and
it is not within the scope of this article to cut that Gordian
knot, but it generates a demand to 'level the playing field'.
Although possibly at variance with EU law, the proposed
road pricing schemes would make the user of a road
system pay equally for its use, irrespective of the home
location of the driver's lorry shed. This has been used
politically by several governments to quell industrial dissent
that on occasion has spilt on to the streets.
There is a strong free market economics argument for
road pricing. This is based on the fact that roads are a
limited resource, best provided for using the price
mechanism. Roads compete with other modes and can be
excluded completely with costs expressed through the
price mechanism. To that end, roads are not being sold 
in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market and as such 
would be best sold, bought, allocated and invested in
through normal market mechanisms. This argument,
whilst popular in the deregulatory corridors of Brussels,
may need reconsidering for road freight where there may
well be no alternative mode, and pricing in purely economic
theory may well be monopolistic and distorting.
Internalising externalities
The free market argument runs parallel with the 'polluter
pays' principle: that users of the road infrastructure should
pay the full cost. This is contentious, since whilst it is 
clear that in the USA in the 1990s road users only
contributed 20-50% of road provision, in Germany that
figure was around 70%, and in some countries such as the
Netherlands and France an argument can be made that
road users contribute 10% more than their proportional
share. Trade Associations often employ this counter
argument, one that becomes more unclear as the issues of
fuel tax, excise duties, road taxes and other fiscal measures
begin to be added to the equation.
What is clear is that there is a body of costs not
previously charged for, those of external costs. These are
generated by a mode of transport that affects others than
the users of the mode, and generate a cost to society.
These are usually listed as congestion, accidents, noise, air
pollution and other emissions. The economic costs of
externalities have been estimated as 4.1% of EU GDP, and
that these costs are under-recovered substantially for cars
and light delivery vehicles (LDV). Since LDVs dominate
urban freight traffic, the externalities of city freight are 
not covered.
Urban areas generate far greater congestion related
externalities than rural or arterial routes. Any scheme that
recovers external costs therefore needs to be able to
differentiate between location and probably time, given 
the nature of traffic.
Those who promote the use of a pricing system based
on externality do so on the basis of efficient pricing. It is 
argued that a mechanism based on marginal social cost will
match supply and demand so as to optimise marginal social
benefits. This is called Marginal Social Cost Pricing 
(MSCP). In this model prices would be best charged in 
real time. A computer would monitor congestion,
pollution levels and accident rates and then post a price on
overhead signs or direct to a cab. Users would change their
routes or plans as the pricing signals flashed up on their
screens. Since this might lead to customers unable to 
cope with the price signals, it is assumed that a more stable
and structured pricing system should be built on the
marginal costing model from classical economic theory.
Others have argued against MSCP, noting that it only
covers variable and not fixed costs and that it can prevent
investment in infrastructure, a key transport problem. It is
difficult to implement, there is no consensus on marginal
cost levels and it may have regressive effects. Congestion
seems to be the externality that drives the economic case
29www.c i l tuk .org .uk
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The road ahead for road
pricing is not clear.
As yet there is no
consistent European view
on the best way to charge
for the true cost of road
freight transportation.
In Germany, road tolls
have been the answer.
Technology such as
surveillance cameras
enables the monitoring 
of road use.
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for road pricing, and yet it could not be an externality since
it only affects road users. MSCP may also be inequitable;
reducing congestion by raising the price to a level to 
affect demand will penalise the poorer road user and favour
the richer.
There is a fundamental difference as to how you cost
road pricing dependent on the goals. Demand management
driven by MSCP will drive price to a point where current
demand will fall – since the good is currently underpriced.
For a revenue based model of road pricing, the price may
well be better set at a lower point, one which will maximise
revenues but not necessarily reduce demand. The
Norwegian tolls are reportedly good at raising revenues but
have little effect on traffic levels.
Reality suggests that revenue raising, meeting investment
shortfalls and political negotiation is actually more often the
basis of prices, whatever the debate about costs. This 
may make the market mechanism distorted, it may not fully
charge road users for their external costs, but in the world
of realpolitik, and without a clearly understood economic
model, it is to be expected.
Use of revenue
Revenues from congestion charging may be huge. The 
Swiss LSVA scheme is expected to be raising € 1 billion per
annum in 2005, against a running cost of only 4%.The first
models of urban road pricing, the cordon tolls in Norway,
were only ever set up as explicit revenue generators.
Finance ministries and politicians have noted the huge
opportunity for revenue and have begun the debate as to
what to use it for. In a purely free market view of
economics, the revenue from one good should be used 
to reward the provider of that good and fund further
investment. To follow that line of thought, all road 
pricing revenue should be spent to fund new roads, signage,
maintenance, and innovation in roads. A proportion might
be dedicated to various core users, bus lanes for buses,
access and signage for freight, messaging systems that target
both general and specific customers.
The European Commission, whilst a deregulator in many
ways, is likely to propose in future proposals that the
shortfall in transport infrastructure is funded in whole or
part by the charges for its use.
Stated aims to promote and achieve modal shift from
road to other modes is likely to mean that they will
propose intentionally distorting the market, shifting revenue
flows between modes to support wider policy goals. In that
they will be following the basis of the UK legislation, which
expressly drives congestion charging revenues in urban
areas into public transport and road infrastructure. The 
ZTL follow-up actions in Rome also suggest that some 
cities may think of funding other city logistics ventures such
as urban distribution centres from the monies.
Parry and Bento explored the interactions between
taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing
taxes in the labour market. They argued that a congestion
tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and
discourages labour force participation at the margin.
The resulting efficiency loss in the labour market can be
larger than the efficiency gains from internalising the
congestion externality. By contrast, if congestion tax
revenues are used to reduce labour taxes, the net impact
on the labour supply is positive and the efficiency gain in the
labour market can raise the overall welfare gains of the
congestion tax by as much as 100%. Recycling congestion
tax revenues in public transit subsidies produces a positive,
but smaller, impact on the labour supply.
One also has to question if the transfer of revenue from
road to rail or public transport is justifiable. If rail freight is
about 8% of the total market, and in the UK rail is planned
to receive three times the investment of roads, how much
of a share of any road pricing scheme should rail receive?
Any road interest group will point out that roads are
substantial income generators: the M1 alone is estimated 
to generate £1 billion annually.
Acceptance
The DESIRE research project explicitly looks at the
acceptance of road pricing and has reported back on the
key acceptance issues for such proposals. They identified
two main types:
Political
l Fairness, non-discriminatory, redistributive of incomes
l Efficiency, the costs of the scheme versus revenue
l Effectiveness – how closely does it meet its 
stated goals?
Paper
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Monitoring equipment
enables the accurate
monitoring of toll road
use in all weathers.
The Swiss system uses
cameras to monitor
usage. C
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l The sharing of a common view as to the problem and
the purpose of pricing
l The principles of pricing
l The application of revenues
Technical/procedural
l User-friendliness
l Administrative costs
l Fraud sensitivity/enforcement
l Privacy of the user
l Robustness of the system
l Transparency
It was noted that freight operators were inclined to
support the use of revenues for dedicated infrastructure
such as express lanes for goods vehicles, and that the freight
transport companies supported the charges, since they
viewed the indirect benefit of lower congestion as of
greater marginal benefit than the charge itself. The 
additional conditions that the freight industry required for
acceptance were:
l No increased administration costs
l No increased tax burden on road transport at a
macroeconomic level
l Closed system of revenue and expenditure with users
influencing investment decisions using earmarked
revenue
l Other modes of transport also internalise external costs
l HGVs pay not more than 100% of the costs for which
they are responsible 
l Since the indirect benefits derive from reduced
passenger transport, private cars must also be part of a
road pricing scheme
Freight industry attitudes towards congestion policies
have been researched and low support for congestion
pricing identified. There was some support amongst 
carriers performing Just-in-Time work with short average
loaded trips and amongst white and brown goods carriers.
The majority of fleets were opposed. On the other hand,
they did find support for improved transport management
and enhanced urban priority for freight. The BESTUFS
research project identified strong opposition from the
freight industries of Spain, Belgium, Switzerland and 
Sweden. Surveys on city freight carried out in the UK in
2002 by the author suggest a higher level of acceptance 
for road pricing, but again a demand for other measures,
such as use of dedicated bus lanes by freight.
31www.c i l tuk .org .uk
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Roadpricing in the UK
The British Road Pricing Feasibility Study has recently been announced by the British Government. The Transport
Secretary Alistair Darling has made it clear he wishes to see charging for all lorries using UK roads, based on distance
travelled. In the meantime, some road charging has been introduced for freight and non-commercial traffic through
private motorways.
The M6 Toll recently reached its 10 millionth customer and celebrated by presenting the driver with a free toll 
trip – in Portugal. Britain's first privately funded motorway reached the milestone figure less than eight months after
opening. The driver, Adrian Wells (pictured in car), won a surprise holiday to Lisbon, complete with hire car and 
a free journey on the Vasco da Gama toll bridge. He was presented his prize by Tom Fanning, Managing Director,
Midland Expressway Ltd.
For a trial period, which commenced on 23rd July 2004 and ends on 31st December 2004, a discount toll applies
for heavy goods vehicles of £6.00 (£5.11 + VAT) during the day and £5.00 (4.26 + VAT) at night. Other prices are
now £2.00 for a motorbike, £3.00 for a car and £6.00 for a van.The £2.00 discounted toll will remain for cars exiting
at intermediate junctions other than the main toll plazas.
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The UK Freight Transport Association (FTA) is
supporting congestion charging as a wide policy objective,
but dismissing any positive effects on freight operators and
claiming that it is an unmerited tax. With particular
reference to the London Congestion Charging Scheme, the
FTA states that the small increase in average travel times will
not be great enough to allow greater consolidation of 
drops into fewer vehicles, meaning no efficiency benefit to
freight. It is stated that freight is very inelastic to congestion
charging; that if a customer requires a timed delivery, the
imposition of a charge to reach that destination is unlikely
to be significant enough to change that demand. Unlike
passenger transport, freight has no alternative in an urban
environment, and as such the charge is viewed as a tax.
The German distance-based pricing is generating dissent
in the long haul business due to compatibility. Freight
companies are concerned about the costs of supporting
equipment and administration for multiple systems, a
Central European operator may have to cope with the
German, Swiss and Austrian schemes in the near future.
Logistics networks do not exist within national borders; the
operational areas of democracy do not fit with those of
logistics. If nation states adopt differing systems, with
differing technologies and different administration, then the
barriers to trade and the on-costs could be comparable to
those suffered by cross border rail with its myriad
conflicting standards.
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For more information on road charging, why not join the Institute's Transport Faculty Road Capacity & Charging Forum? See Web site:
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In the next issue of Logistics
& Transport Focus, we will
look at current toll schemes
operated in some European
cities, and how freight
operators have reacted to
their introduction.
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